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Abstract 
 
The European Union (EU) may be presiding over the most successful democracy promotion 
program ever implemented by an international actor. Among postcommunist states with a 
credible EU membership perspective, we can see a significant – though far from complete – 
convergence toward liberal democracy. This is all the more interesting since ten years ago 
many of these states had illiberal or authoritarian regimes. I focus in this article on the 
sources of political change in previously illiberal regimes before and after “watershed elec-
tions,” especially in the Western Balkans. I argue that over time the EU’s leverage strength-
ened the hand of liberal forces against illiberal ones by way of four mechanisms: creating a 
focal point for cooperation, providing incentives for adapting, using conditionality, and ser-
ving as a credible commitment for reform. Consequently, most political parties have even-
tually changed their agenda to make it compatible with the state’s bid for EU membership. I 
investigate the domestic conditions that have caused these mechanisms to function only 
weakly in Serbia and Bosnia. 
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  The European Union (EU) may well be presiding over the most successful de-
mocracy promotion program ever implemented by an international actor. All of the 
states that have become credible future EU members over the last decade are making 
progress toward liberal democracy and a more transparent market economy. The puzzle 
is one of causation:  does the EU only accept liberal democracies? Or, does the condition 
of being a credible future EU member create incentives for political actors to make their 
political agendas compatible with liberal democracy and the state’s bid for EU member-
ship? 
 
The convergence that we see toward liberal democracy today is all the more puz-
zling given the divergence in regimes in the region some ten years ago. In some post-
communist states, democratically elected governments began laying the foundations of 
liberal democracy and implementing comprehensive economic reforms immediately af-
ter the collapse of the communist regime. In other postcommunist states, however, one 
faction monopolized power, and created the conditions of illiberal democracy for their 
own political and economic gain. By illiberal democracy, I mean a political system where 
regular elections of some kind take place, but elected rulers and the state institutions 
they control do not respect the juridical limits on their powers or the political liberties of 
their citizens. They violate the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the boundaries 
between the state and the economy. Important for our cases, they abuse the limits on 
their powers and the political liberties of citizens in order to suppress rival political par-
ties or groups. In illiberal democracies, important requirements of EU membership were 
at loggerheads with the sources of political power of ruling elites. Progress toward the 
EU was slow or absent. Even as the EU began to implement the conditionality of the pre-
accession process, it had little success in changing domestic policies in illiberal democra-
cies: governments turned their backs on the benefits of EU membership to protect their 
power and rent-seeking opportunities. 
 
Yet the condition of being a credible future EU member impacted domestic poli-
tics in illiberal democracies in a number of ways that are more complicated and intrigu-
ing than simple conditionality, the centerpiece of most enlargement studies thus far. I ar-
gue in this article that over time the EU’s leverage strengthened the hand of liberal 
forces against illiberal ones: not in a duel where good vanquishes evil, but in an iterated 
electoral game where sooner or later most political actors – especially political parties – 
saw the benefits of moving their own agenda toward compatibility with the state’s bid 
for EU membership. As postcommunist politics have demonstrated over and over again, 
with a little fine tuning most political actors – however dispirited, discredited or de-
spised – can find their way back into the political game, and indeed back into office. 
Only in the run-up to joining the EU, there is a twist: the EU’s leverage helps set the para-
meters and write the rules of that game. Once membership is achieved the parameters 
change again – and evidently they become looser – but this is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
 
How does EU leverage translate into domestic political change in illiberal re-
gimes? The EU’s “gravitational force” pulling countries on a liberal democratic path is 
invoked very often; my purpose in this article is to unpack just how this may work. I 
have identified four mechanisms that contribute to regime change, two that operate be-
fore and two that operate after what I call “watershed elections.” These are the elections   3 
in which illiberal elites that have monopolized power since the end of communism lose 
power decisively, and are forced to leave office.  
 
Before watershed elections, moving toward European integration and away from 
international isolation serves as a focal point for cooperation among opposition parties and 
groups that have in most cases been highly fragmented and querulous. The second 
mechanism is adapting: the prospect of joining the EU creates incentives for opposition 
politicians and other domestic actors to adapt their political and economic agendas to 
come closer to satisfying the expectations of the EU and other international organiza-
tions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Coun-
cil of Europe, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
 
After watershed elections, straightforward conditionality is at play: for the new 
governments moving forward in the EU’s pre-accession process and receiving various 
intermediate rewards is tied to adopting laws and implementing reforms. Second, the 
process itself serves as a credible commitment to reform. Reversing direction becomes cost-
ly for any future government. As candidates move forward in the process, governments 
are locked into a predictable course of policymaking that serves as an important signal 
to internal and external economic actors about the future business environment. 
Through the pre-accession process, the EU bundles together the influence of many inter-
national organizations and other international actors, and sustains this influence over 
time. 
 
The six cases that I explore in this article – with the corresponding watershed 
elections in brackets – are Romania (1996), Bulgaria (1997), Slovakia (1998), Croatia 
(2000), Serbia  (2000) and Bosnia (2000/2006?).1 I am not arguing that the wish to join the 
EU influenced how voters cast their ballots in these elections: in all six cases, voters 
probably had more immediate reasons to vote against the incumbents.2 Instead, EU lev-
erage contributed to a redirection of domestic politics that occurred in two steps: first, 
the EU and other international actors helped shape the agendas of the opposition parties 
that were waiting in the wings to win these elections. Second, once in power, these par-
ties set in motion a reform process that has sometimes slowed down, but that has never 
derailed, thanks to the strictures of the EU’s pre-accession process, and this despite sub-
sequent political turnovers and even the return of the formerly illiberal parties to power. 
As the reform momentum becomes locked in, it triggers another wave of adapting as 
most of the formerly illiberal parties adjust their agenda to be compatible with liberal 
democracy and comprehensive economic reform. For the country’s future democratic 
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2000, but political parties have adapted to the Western liberal democratic and economic agenda 
only slowly and erratically. It is significant that both Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro are the states 
where fundamental questions of statehood remain unsettled or unresolved. Here I analyze only 
Serbia’s domestic politics, centered on Belgrade, even though Serbia was formally part of the 
country Serbia-Montenegro until June 2006. I use Bosnia as shorthand for the full name of the 
country, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
2For the argument that the prospect of EU membership does impact how voters cast their ballots, 
Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky 2002.   4 
trajectory, this second wave of adapting is the most significant political change – and it is 
this change that in 2006 is so visibly stalled in Serbia.  
 
Scholars have only begun to explain the substantial variation in the policies and 
the institutions adopted by East Central Europe’s so-called “early reformers,” but the 
question of why postcommunist governments with liberal preferences adopted gener-
ally liberal policies is ultimately not that puzzling.3 For my cases, I have therefore se-
lected those countries that were dominated by illiberal rulers for a substantial period of 
time after 1989, but that eventually changed course toward liberal democracy. In the 
cases of Serbia and Bosnia, the mechanisms that I identify have functioned weakly, and 
the status of Bosnia as an international protectorate means that they have functioned dif-
ferently. And while all six countries have made at least some progress, exploring the 
variation in the speed and content of that progress helps illuminate the domestic condi-
tions that determine how well external incentives can help overcome illiberal rule. In-
deed, it is possible that in five or ten years we will conclude that the mechanisms I set 
out in this article were ultimately not strong enough to overcome countervailing domes-
tic forces in Serbia or Bosnia. 
 
This article is organized in five parts. The first part explores the literature on the 
influence of international actors on democratization in general, and the impact of the EU 
on credible future members in particular. The second part shows the divergence in poli-
tical and economic trajectories among postcommunist states after 1989, and the signs of 
convergence among EU candidates over the last decade. The third explains the mecha-
nisms of focal point for cooperation and adapting in bringing political change to illiberal 
regimes. The fourth explains the mechanisms of conditionality and credible commitment to 
reform in helping to lock in democratic changes. The fifth explores alternative mecha-
nisms that could drive political change, looking at the recent cases of “democratic break-
throughs” in postcommunist states that are not in the EU membership queue. 
 
1. International Actors and Democratization  
 
The impact of international actors on democratization is now one of the most ex-
citing areas of study in international relations and comparative politics. This is some-
thing of a departure from past scholarship. In diverse literatures on democratization and 
economic reform in Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia or Africa, the impact of external 
actors was usually considered harmful or at best indifferent.4 The exception was democ-
ratization on the European continent, where joining the EU was credited with support-
ing transition and consolidation in Portugal, Spain and Greece.5 Since 1990, the greater 
and apparently more constructive impact of international actors on democratization 
worldwide can be attributed in part to the end of the Cold War, which removed (per-
haps temporarily) ideology as a trump card for regime type in the eyes of Western for-
eign policy. Jon Pevehouse finds that several regional organizations worldwide have 
                                                 
3I use “East Central Europe” as shorthand for those postcommunist states of East Central and 
South Eastern Europe that have already joined the EU, or that are officially considered candidates 
or proto-candidates. See Table 1. 
4Haggard and Webb 1994, 5; and Schmitter 1986, 5. See also Kahler 1992. 
5Pridham 1991; Whitehead 2001; and Ziblatt and Biziouras 2005.   5 
bolstered the likelihood of democratic success on the part of their members.6 Steven 
Levitsky and Lucan Way demonstrate that strong political, economic and social linkages 
with Western countries undermine the ability of elites in competitive authoritarian sys-
tems worldwide to thwart domestic democratization efforts.7 
 
Yet postcommunist East Central Europe has taken center stage in demonstrating 
the potential of external democracy promotion efforts. There, regime change in 1989 
took place on the very highly institutionalized European continent, where many estab-
lished international organizations and a parade of other transnational actors were well-
placed to develop strategies for shaping domestic political change. While the extent, the 
time frame and the track record of these strategies has varied greatly, virtually all of 
them have aimed at promoting some aspect of liberal democracy and free market capi-
talism. This “bundling” of sustained external influence has been far less apparent in 
other regions of the world where, even since the end of the Cold War, international 
actors have so often pursued episodic, incompatible or even mutually antagonistic agen-
das when seeking to influence domestic politics.8 But of all of the international actors 
active on the European continent, I argue that the EU has had by far the greatest lever-
age on domestic political change in states that became credible future EU members – 
both directly, and by amplifying the leverage of other actors.  
 
By demonstrating how EU leverage has helped loosen the grip on the postcom-
munist polity of elites that seek to perpetuate illiberal democracy, this article contributes 
to the recent literature on the origin, the dynamics and the demise of democratic hy-
brids.9 Scholars have debated whether the democratization of communist states can be 
productively compared to democratization in other parts of the world owing to the 
uniqueness of communism’s impact on the polity, the economy and society.10 However, 
the behavior of ruling elites when seizing and holding power in that gray zone between 
liberal democracy and outright authoritarianism – be it called illiberal democracy, elec-
toral democracy, hybrid democracy or competitive authoritarianism – is in many re-
spects similar across countries and regions. And it turns out that the way that they lose 
power – through elections – is often similar as well.11 The incentives of EU membership, 
however, are not so easily generalizable. In unpacking the mechanisms that help dis-
lodge illiberal regimes in postcommunist countries, I shed light on a worldwide phe-
nomenon, but the source of durable political change that I uncover – the prospect of EU 
membership – is only available at this time to certain East European states. 
 
                                                 
6Pevehouse 2005. 
7Levitsky and Way 2006. See also Schmitter 2001. 
8For the argument that IMF-style economic reforms in Eastern Europe were less ideologically 
charged and more compatible with democratic politics than in Latin America, see Pop-Eleches 
2006.  
9Karl 1995; Zakaria 1997; Diamond 2002; and Levitsky and Way 2002. 
10Bunce 1995; in debate with Schmitter and Karl 1994. 
11Levitsky and Way 2006; McFaul 2005; and Morjé Howard and Roessler 2006.   6 
EU Enlargement and Domestic Political Change 
 
In the study of EU enlargement to postcommunist states, there is broad agree-
ment that the EU’s pre-accession process has brought potent if uneven conditionality 
and socialization to bear on domestic politics in the candidate states. 12 Most studies fo-
cus on how the institutions and the content of domestic policymaking have been influ-
enced by EU conditionality during the negotiations for membership.13 But those states 
where illiberal democracy took hold and economic reforms were neglected have had a 
long way to go in their relationship with the EU before they could begin negotiations, or 
even obtain candidate status. In this article I fill this gap in the literature by specifying 
the causal mechanisms by which EU leverage undermined illiberal regimes, and then 
locked in progress toward liberal democracy and economic liberalization after these re-
gimes were ousted. I neglect investigating the effectiveness of EU conditionality in spe-
cific policy areas in favor of its impact on regime outcomes and the overarching compo-
sition of national party systems. 
 
Here it is important to take a step back and look briefly at the nature of the rela-
tionship between the EU and its democratizing postcommunist neighbors. Despite fears 
of diminished national sovereignty and increased economic vulnerability, EU member-
ship rapidly emerged as a matter of national interest after 1989 in many of the “early re-
formers” because it offered substantial geopolitical, sociocultural and economic benefits, 
including the protection of EU rules for weak states.14 But between 1989 and 1994, the 
EU and other international actors had little impact on the course of political change: they 
reinforced liberal strategies of reform in some states, while failing to avert, end or signi-
ficantly diminish illiberal strategies for winning and exercising power in others. The 
turning point occurred in 1995 as the EU made clear that for those states recognized as 
credible future EU members, compliance with EU requirements would be rewarded by 
EU membership – and that the voluntary decision to apply for EU membership would 
subject a candidate to a battery of unilateral monitoring and reporting. 
 
The EU’s leverage is animated by the fact that the substantial benefits of EU 
membership – and the costs of exclusion – create incentives for states to satisfy the entry 
requirements.15  Following this logic alone, we may conclude that the benefits of EU 
membership for postcommunist states must be immense: at no time in history have sov-
ereign states voluntarily agreed to meet such vast domestic requirements and then sub-
jected themselves to such intrusive verification procedures to enter an international or-
ganization. For states that fail to enter an enlarging EU along with their neighbors, a 
steady flow of aid, expertise, trade and foreign direct investment is diverted away from 
                                                 
12Among the most theoretically innovative analyses of the impact of the EU and NATO across 
multiple policy areas and countries are Jacoby 2004; Epstein 2007; and the contributions to Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier eds. 2005. For the groundbreaking study of how the EU and other in-
ternational actors used conditionality to improve the treatment of ethnic minorities, Kelley 2004a. 
13The wealth of recent studies focusing on  EU conditionality include Grabbe 2006; and Pridham 
2005. For the EU’s impact in specific policy areas see, for example, Andonova 2003 (environ-
ment); Dimitrova 2002 (public administration reform); Epstein 2006 and McDermott 2006 (eco-
nomic policy); Mattli and Plumper 2004 (regulatory reform); and Sissenich 2007 (social policy). 
14Hoffmann and Keohane 1993, 388; and Keohane 1993, 293-6. 
15For a fuller discussion, Vachudova 2005.   7 
states that are not in the queue to join the EU towards those that are.16 The costs of exclu-
sion can weigh heavily on relatively rich states as well as poor ones. Walter Mattli has 
shown that economic integration can cause three kinds of negative externalities for 
states left outside: trade diversion, investment diversion and aid diversion. These costs 
help explain the applications for EU membership of rich West European states as well as 
relatively backward states from postcommunist Europe.17 
 
The potential political will to satisfy the EU’s entry requirements set the stage for 
the effectiveness of conditionality within the EU’s pre-accession process. As I will show 
in the next two sections, this process has mediated the costs and benefits of satisfying EU 
membership criteria in such a way as to make compliance attractive – and noncom-
pliance visible and costly. In addition to the benefits and the requirements of member-
ship, there are three characteristics of the pre-accession process – of the way that the EU 
“delivers” political and economic conditionality – that have made the EU’s leverage ef-
fective. They are: asymmetric interdependence, enforcement, and meritocracy.18 These 
characteristics amplify the incentives to comply with the EU’s membership requirements 
because they make the EU’s threat of exclusion as well as its promises of membership 
more credible. Power in an interdependent relationship flows from asymmetry, and the 
ECE states have much more to gain from the relationship than the EU.19 Such patterns of 
“asymmetrical interdependence” have determined relations between the EU and candi-
date states in the past – and also among EU member states during major treaty negotia-
tions.20 Meanwhile, the monitoring of the progress of candidates in satisfying EU re-
quirements through annual reports and through chapter by chapter negotiations on the 
acquis communautaire have built an imperfect but high level of enforcement into the pre-
accession process.21 
 
In the run-up to the 2004 enlargement, with certain exceptions, the right balance 
was struck: candidates were neither too confident (thanks to asymmetric interdepen-
dence), nor were they too disingenuous (thanks to enforcement), nor did they despair 
that the system was stacked against them (thanks to meritocracy). While asymmetric in-
terdependence and enforcement both give credibility to the EU’s threats of exclusion, 
meritocracy gives credibility to its promises of eventual membership. So far the EU has 
adopted a roughly merit-based approach: an applicant’s place in the membership queue 
has corresponded to the progress it has made toward fulfilling the EU’s requirements.22 
The European Commission’s evaluations and the European Council’s decisions about 
                                                 
16World Bank 2000; Grabbe 2001; and Kaminski 2001. 
17Mattli 1999. 
18Vachudova 2005, 108-17. 
19Keohane and Nye 1977. 
20Moravcsik 1991; Moravcsik 1998; and Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003. 
21In comparison to what other international actors have managed, the level compliance has been 
remarkable, even though in absolute terms substantial portions of the aquis have been poorly im-
plemented at the time of accession. Cameron 2003. 
22The EU’s approach to negotiations with Turkey risks severely testing the meritocracy principle. 
If the determinant of Turkey’s membership becomes a French referendum instead of the quality 
of Turkey’s reforms, it will be obliterated. Turkey’s status as a credible future member is conse-
quently already compromised, and may well explain the recent slowdown of Turkey’s reforms.   8 
the overall status of candidates or proto-candidates have generally been accepted as re-
flecting accurately the state of compliance. 
 
The meritocracy principle has held up surprisingly well even in the complicated 
and contested relationship between the EU and several Western Balkan states. It was put 
to the test in 2005 by the decision to put on hold the start of membership negotiations 
with Croatia because of the government’s failure to cooperate fully with the ICTY in de-
livering the indicted war criminal Ante Gotovina to the Hague. Despite protests that the 
state administration had been cooperating, the Croatian government responded with 
initiatives to improve compliance. No government official or major political party leader 
condemned the EU’s decision in public, or questioned the advisability of Croatia com-
plying rapidly with EU demands.23 The meritocracy principle has been put to the test 
again in 2006 as the EU has suspended the start of negotiations on an association agree-
ment with Serbia because of the failure of the Serbian government to deliver indicted 
war criminal Ratko Mladić to the Hague. The response by the Serbian government and 
party leaders has been much more critical than in Croatia. However, the (nationalist) 
prime minister Vojislav Koštunica and his government have persevered with proposals 
to put Serbia back on course, and have not questioned Serbia’s obligation to arrest 
Mladić.24 While Serbian leaders often say that they will deal with the EU as “equal part-
ners,” the reality  that this is impossible for any candidate is becoming better under-
stood.25 
 
At the outset of the enlargement process, it is unlikely that the EU intended to 
tackle the democratization of a country as vexing as Serbia. The very extensive require-
ments of EU membership are mostly a product of the very high levels of integration 
among EU member states. For the rest, they were not designed to coax and cajole every 
conceivably “European” state into making itself desirable. In the middle of the 1990s, the 
emphasis was rather on keeping unqualified states outside of the EU. By the late 1990s, 
however, enlargement and foreign policy had become closely intertwined as it became 
clear that the EU’s leverage on aspiring members was the most powerful and successful 
aspect of the EU’s emerging foreign policy. Recognizing this, EU leaders made the pros-
pect of EU membership the cornerstone of the EU’s foreign policy toward the Western 
Balkans in the EU-led Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe in 1999. It was in this re-
gion that the EU’s credibility as a foreign policy actor was most clearly at stake. The Sta-
bility Pact raised the EU’s official membership queue in 2000 to eighteen candidates and 
proto-candidates (see Table 1). 
 
For the illiberal democracies in the EU’s membership queue, the EU’s approach 
gradually became one of explicit democracy promotion; this was weakest in the cases of 
Romania and Bulgaria, and has been most overt in Serbia and Bosnia. What turned out 
to be important was that the meritocracy principle was extended across time in one 
country as well as across countries. In other words, however dismal a country’s past 
record of respecting democratic standards and human rights, it could “rehabilitate” 
itself by implementing the necessary reforms under a future government. Serbia-
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24Reuters, 16 August 2006. 
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Montenegro became a credible future member of the EU in 1999, and as such had a clear 
and relatively certain track toward membership despite the fact that the regime of Slobo-
dan Milošević was still firmly in place. In Slovakia, commenting on the intransigence of 
the regime of Vladimír Mečiar, the EU Commissioner for External Relations Hans Van 
den Broek explained in the spring of 1998 that, “The question is not whether Slovakia 
will enter the EU, but when this will take place. The answer is in the hands of the Slovak 
government.”26 
 
Table 1 
The Queue to Join the European Union, 2006 
 
EU-15    New  Members  2004   Candidates 
in order of accession  in order of application    in order of application 
 
France    Cyprus  1990    Turkey  1987     
Germany   Malta  1990    Bulgaria  1995   
Italy    Hungary  1994    Romania  1995    
Belgium   Poland  1994    Croatia  2003   
Netherlands   Slovakia  1995    Macedonia  2004 
 Luxembourg   Latvia  1995       
   Estonia  1995    Proto-Candidates  
U. Kingdom 1973  Lithuania 1995    promised membership in  
Ireland 1973   Czech Rep. 1996    1999 Stability Pact 
  Denmark  1973   Slovenia  1996    Albania    
Greece 1981          Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Spain 1986    = 25 members    Montenegro    
Portugal  1986       Serbia 
S w e d e n   1 9 9 5        K o s o v o ?    
Finland  1995         
Austria  1995         = 35 members   
       
= 15 members        
 
The Outsourcing of International Influence 
 
I argued above that the EU has had by far the greatest impact of any interna-
tional actor in shaping the course of political change in ECE states since 1989. This is be-
cause the EU has had an outstanding reward – membership – to offer states that estab-
lish a functioning liberal democracy and market economy, as well as the most valuable 
“intermediate rewards” to offer along the way. In comparison, other international or-
ganizations and other kinds of external actors have, individually, much less to offer – 
and have asked for much less in return.  
 
But the EU’s leverage has also amplified directly, significantly – and often by 
design – the influence of other international actors in the region. In some policy areas, 
the European Commission has simply “contracted out” the conditions that candidates 
                                                 
26SME, 18 June 1998.   10 
should meet, and the assessment of whether they have done so. 27 The centerpiece of the 
Regular Reports is a general evaluation of how the candidate is meeting those Copen-
hagen Requirements that are above and beyond the norms, rules and regulations in 
force among existing EU member states as expressed in the acquis. For the protection of 
ethnic minority rights, the Commission had depended chiefly on the evaluations of the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, and also the Council of Europe. Put 
simply, governments fulfill their obligations to the Council of Europe and the OSCE be-
cause the EU has incorporated these obligations (and implicitly the approval of these or-
ganizations) into the requirements for EU membership. In this way, the EU has boosted 
the influence of both international organizations, granting legitimacy to the standards 
that they set and creating material sanctions for the violation of those standards. 
 
The economic requirements of the Copenhagen criteria also include an overall 
assessment of whether the candidate has a functioning market economy. On the fitness 
of the economy, the Commission has listened to the views of the World Bank, the IMF 
and the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, boosting their influ-
ence in a similar way. The most striking recent case of “outsourcing” has been the EU’s 
insistence that Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia cooperate fully with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in order to satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria of 
robust democratic institutions and the protection of ethnic minority rights. The EU has 
been periodically uneasy with the ICTY’s assessments of whether or not a state is “co-
operating fully,” but it has realized that if it does not act in step with the ICTY, then it 
will undermine very severely its authority.28 
 
A more diffuse way that the EU’s leverage has boosted the influence of a wide 
array of transnational actors is by creating incentives for local elites to learn from them. 
As I argue below, the prospect of joining the EU creates incentives for political parties to 
change their agendas, and to translate those changes into how they govern when in  
power. Politicians have therefore been interested in learning about the content of a pro-
Western agenda, especially those that have recently abandoned nationalist, anti-market 
or anti-democratic practices. But strategic learning has extended far beyond politicians. 
The opportunities associated with moving toward the EU for economic actors and civic 
groups have also created demand for the conferences, workshops and programs offered 
by Western non-governmental organizations and foundations. 
 
Moving forward, I make the assumption that the states in this study all have an 
equally credible prospect of qualifying for EU membership, and can expect roughly 
equal treatment in the pre-accession process. (If anything, the EU has erred on the side 
of leniency and inclusion in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria.) Thus, holding the incen-
tives of EU membership high, constant and exogenous, I turn to explaining the puzzle of 
the remarkable divergence – and subsequent convergence – in their response to these in-
centives. 
 
                                                 
27Kelley 2004a. 
28Interviews with officials of the European Commission and the European Council, Brussels, July 
2005.   11 
2. Divergence and Convergence in the Postcommunist World 
 
The collapse of communism between 1989 and 1991 throughout the region ac-
companied by the end of the Soviet Union was a critical juncture for the political devel-
opment of all East European states. For many, it was also a period that set in motion 
forces seeking national independence: the “communist” region went from nine states in 
198929 to twenty-seven in 1995. By 1995 the spectrum of political outcomes among these 
twenty-seven states ranged from liberal democracy to rigid authoritarianism.30 It was 
not surprising that states emerging newly independent from the Soviet Union after over 
seven decades of Soviet communism would initially follow trajectories different from 
states in East Central and South Eastern Europe. But the variation among the states of 
East Central Europe was also striking, ranging from liberal democracy in Poland and 
Hungary to authoritarianism and war in the disintegrating Yugoslavia.31 
 
A decade later, do we see a convergence toward liberal democracy and economic 
liberalization among the subset of postcommunist states that are credible future mem-
bers of the EU? By plotting the scores that these states have received from Freedom 
House and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, respectively, we 
can see such a convergence. Figure 1 shows that in 1997 the six states in this study were 
receiving low scores for both political freedom and economic liberalization, putting 
them far behind East Central Europe’s “early reformers” and in close proximity with 
states such as Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. Figure 2 shows that by 2003 Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia and, most dramatically, Slovakia, had made substantial progress in catching up 
with the “early reformers” on both political and economic measures.32  Figure 2 also 
shows that by 2003 all but Bosnia had “pulled away” from the post-Soviet states on their 
political freedom scores; this trend continued in 2005 with some improvement across the 
five Western Balkan states. 
 
We can also point to a variety of other measures that indicate gradual progress 
and convergence. Elections are free and fair, and all large, mainstream parties are com-
mitted to the democratic rules of the game – except perhaps the Serbian Radical Party 
(SRS) in Serbia. Ethnic minorities are in a much better position in Romania, Slovakia and 
Bulgaria, with no signs of reversal. Croatia and (more slowly) Serbia are moving toward 
                                                 
29The Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Alba-
nia and Yugoslavia. For the twenty-seven postcommunist states on the European continent (with-
out the “east” of unified Germany), see Figure 1. On why so many new states, see Bunce 1999b 
and 2005. 
30On divergence in regime types among postcommunist states, see Cameron 2001; Cameron 2005; 
Fish 2005; and Kitschelt 2003. 
31For more comprehensive treatments of political outcomes in postcommunist states, see Ander-
son, Fish, Hanson and Roeder eds. 2001; Appel ed. 2005; Bunce 1999a; Ekiert 2003; Ekiert and 
Hanson eds. 2003; Rupnik 1999; and Vachudova 2005.  
32Excluding the Western Balkan states from the group of EU candidates, David Cameron finds 
that by 2001 the ten EU candidates (including Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia) extended rights 
and liberties such that they were comparable to many EU member states. But the other postcom-
munist states actually experienced a decrease in the average score; in the latter group, rights and 
liberties were, on average, less extensive and secure in 2001 than they had been in 1991. Cameron 
2001.   12 
liberal democracy after emerging from a decade of authoritarianism and war that impli-
cated both polities in state-sponsored genocide. All of the formerly illiberal democracies 
have made progress toward the next milestone of EU membership – from a catapult to 
membership on the part of Slovakia to the opening, finally, of negotiations on an asso-
ciation agreement between the EU and Bosnia. As discussed above, Serbia has yet to 
open similar negotiations, but at least relations with the EU have become a daily obses-
sion of domestic politics. There are still myriad problems in absolute terms with the 
quality of democracy in all of these states, but the relative progress of each state since 
1995 is indisputable. 
 
It is more difficult to make the case that the Western Balkan states of Albania, 
Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro are converging with ECE frontrunners on the 
measures of economic liberalization and economic institutional change alone. Indeed, as 
Figures 2 and 3 show, they fit quite comfortably in the group of post-Soviet slow-pace 
reformers. Only Croatia shows signs of rapid economic progress. This is also the finding 
of George Georgiadis after analyzing the aggregate transition scores for economic insti-
tutional change across the twenty-seven cases from 1991 to 2002. He argues that it is the 
ten candidates for EU membership that form a group within which countries are con-
verging economically, with Croatia knocking at the door.33 Serbia and Bosnia as well as 
Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro face exceptionally difficult obstacles for economic 
revitalization that are too complex to discuss here. Still, if the quality of political compe-
tition continues to improve (considered below), there are good reasons to expect that 
progress in the EU’s pre-accession process, tied to greater access to the EU market and 
more foreign investment, will bring economic liberalization and institutional improve-
ments over time as it has for previous candidate states.34 
 
                                                 
33Georgiadis 2005. 
34European Commission 2006; and World Bank 2000.   13 
Figure 1: Democracy and Economic Liberalization in the Postcommunist Region in 1997 
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Figure 2: Democracy and Economic Liberalization in the Postcommunist Region in 2003 
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Figure 3: Democracy and Economic Liberalization in the Postcommunist Region in 2005 
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One of the most difficult issues in studying democratization is untangling politi-
cal change from economic upswings and downturns, and from changes in the way that 
ruling elites administer the economy. In the postcommunist region, fifteen years of data 
reveal that greater political freedom, more economic liberalization, and better economic 
performance have all gone hand in hand. In other words, there appears to be no trade-
off between democratization and economic liberalization.35 Figures 1-3 show a correla-
tion between a country’s political freedom rating and its implementation of economic re-
form; that is, the higher a country is rated for the quality of its democracy, the more pro-
gress it has generally made on market reform. Similar patterns emerge using a variety of 
indexes for economic reform against the Freedom House democratization index.36 There 
is also a correlation between the completeness of economic reforms and the level of ag-
gregate social welfare ten years after the transition began. That is, those countries that 
put in place the most rapid and complete economic reforms recovered most quickly, reg-
istered the highest levels of economic growth, and generated the lowest increase in in-
                                                 
35Fish 1999: 808-9. 
36Using a World Bank/EBRD Structural Reform index against Freedom House data and averaging 
the scores received for each year between 1990 and 2000 yields a similar result: Oatley 2004, 386; 
and Aslund 2002, 362. See also EBRD 2000.   16 
come disparities.37 In Latin American states, for example, the relationship between de-
mocratization and market liberalization that we see in Figures 1-3 would look quite dif-
ferent.38 The positive correlation among ECE’s frontrunners can be attributed partly to in-
tegration into the EU economy, and also to the EU’s insistence that liberalization be 
accompanied by institutional change. It is stalled economic reform in the hands of illib-
eral elites – and not  EU-induced liberalization – that damages the well-being of the gen-
eral population. This makes it possible to lump the EU’s democratic and economic re-
quirements together instead of problematizing their divergent effects.  
 
3. Regime Change in Illiberal Democracies 
 
Why do we see so much divergence in regime types among postcommunist 
states?  There is substantial evidence that the quality of political competition determined 
their early trajectories. In conditions of limited political competition, illiberal elites could 
win and concentrate power by further suppressing rival groups, promising slow eco-
nomic reform, and exploiting ethnic nationalism – all the while extracting significant 
rents from slow economic reform.39 Scholars have developed several related explana-
tions for the variation in political outcomes that we observe after 1989. These include the 
configuration of domestic elites at the moment of regime change;40 the outcome of the 
first democratic elections;41 and the character of political competition in the new polity.42 
In Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation,43 the de-
mobilization of liberal-minded publics through ethnic violence,44 as well as other factors 
created more highly authoritarian regimes than in Bulgaria, Romania or Slovakia. But 
the basic recipe for concentrating power was the same: suppressing opposition groups, 
plundering the economy and exploiting ethnic nationalism. The mechanisms that I high-
light in this article all work to improve the quality of political competition by breaking 
this concentration of power in the hands of illiberal elites. 
 
In the relationship between the EU and all credible future members, we can ex-
pect compliance with EU requirements when these are compatible with their domestic 
                                                 
37World Bank 2002, 73-4, 107. 
38Among other factors, the structural changes that these states experienced under communism, 
including high levels of literacy and low levels of income inequality, made labor forces relatively 
well prepared to adjust to and profit from market liberalization and from the proximity of the 
wealthy EU market. See Roeder 1999. 
39Vachudova 2005, 11-61; and Mansfield and Snyder 1995. The seminal work on the grip of rent-
seeking elites profiting from partial economic reform in postcommunist states is Hellman 1998. 
See also Ganev 2001 and Gould 2004. 
40Bunce 1999a; McFaul 2002; Vachudova and Snyder 1997. 
41Fish 1998. 
42While there is broad agreement that the character of political competition including the (non) 
concentration of power helps determine the quality of democracy in postcommunist states, there 
is considerable debate about how to define and operationalize it. See Fish 1999, 803-8; Frye 2002; 
Grzymala-Busse 2003; Grzymala-Busse 2006; O’Dwyer 2004; Orenstein 2001; and Vachudova 
2005. For the similar measure of political openness versus closure, see Fish 2005. 
43Bunce 1999b. 
44Gagnon 2005.   17 
sources of power.45 For the illiberal rulers at hand (see Table 2), EU requirements were 
obviously at loggerheads with the ways that they won and held power at home, such as 
abrogating democratic standards and remunerating cronies through highly corrupt eco-
nomic practices. Consequently, the EU’s leverage generally failed to influence directly 
the domestic policies of illiberal regimes. 
 
Instead, I argue that the relationship between the EU and credible future mem-
bers helped change the domestic balance of power in illiberal democracies against (high-
ly) rent-seeking elites by strengthening the opposition. Given that flawed but regular 
elections were taking place, the key was the impact of the EU’s leverage on opposition 
political parties and other groups in society. These domestic actors served as the inter-
mediary between the EU and the citizens, and they were the only realistic vehicle for 
rapid change given the intransigence of the ruling political parties. It was the interplay 
of domestic opposition actors and the EU’s leverage (and not external pressure alone) 
that helped bring political change. Ultimately, through these mechanisms, EU leverage 
helped create what the illiberal democracies were missing at the moment of transition: a 
more coherent and moderate opposition, and a more open and pluralistic political arena. 
 
Focal Point of Cooperation 
 
Ending exclusion from Europe and securing EU membership became a focal point 
for cooperation among very different opposition political parties and civic groups. In Ro-
mania, Slovakia, Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, small parties and factions of the center left 
and center right competed and feuded with one another, substantially weakening the 
power of moderate voices in parliament through wasted votes and infighting.46 Liberal, 
pro-Western actors in these countries had little or no history of cooperation in an op-
position movement against communism to help establish habits of compromise and 
organizational strength. Meanwhile, the ruling political parties worked hard to under-
mine and divide the opposition parties by manipulating the electoral law, controlling 
key media outlets, labeling critics of government policy as unpatriotic, and in some cases 
engaging in physical harassment. While their differences on matters of social and eco-
nomic policy spanned the entire moderate (and sometimes immoderate) political spec-
trum, electoral defeats and harassment by the regime showed that the opposition forces 
would have to band together in order to unseat the ruling elites. In a recent study, Marc 
Morjé Howard and Philip Roessler similarly find that a key factor in dislodging illiberal 
(“competitive authoritarian”) regimes is the formation of a strategic coalition by opposi-
tion elites for the purpose of mounting a credible challenge to the ruling party.47 
 
                                                 
45Several studies concur that credible EU membership incentives elicit compliance from ECE gov-
ernments only when the requirements of membership are compatible with their overall domestic 
agenda and therefore adoption costs are low: Kelley 2004a and 2004b; Schimmelfennig 2005a and 
2005b; Vachudova 2001 and 2005. 
46In Bulgaria the opposition was largely united in the UDF party. Embarking on political and eco-
nomic reforms to qualify for EU membership, however, became a core of the UDF ’s platform, in-
stead of  the party’s earlier, unpopular backward-looking retribution and restitution policies. 
Interviews with UDF government officials, Sofia, 1998. 
47Morjé Howard and Roessler 2006.   18 
Western actors, in cooperation with local nongovernmental organizations, some-
times took a very direct role in trying to unite and strengthen the feuding opposition 
leaders in Romania, Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia. The most dramatic attempts involved 
the Serb opposition, which was repeatedly assembled by Western actors at conferences 
in various European capitals in hopes of overcoming personal enmities and forging 
closer and better cooperation against the Milošević regime.48 In Bosnia, Western actors 
brokered an alliance among less nationalist parties competing in all three party systems 
(Bosniak, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb). In addition, the EU signaled that only cer-
tain groupings of opposition elites would be acceptable partners for the “return to Eu-
rope,” directly influencing the coalition potential of individual political parties. This 
helped end the episodic cooperation of some opposition parties with the illiberal regime, 
and excluded the possibility of an opposition party creating a coalition with the ruling 
illiberal party after the next elections.49 
 
Meanwhile, reproaching the ruling elites for forsaking the country’s place in Eu-
rope –  and promising to move the country decisively toward “Europe” –  became a key 
tenet of the opposition’s platform, upon which all parties and other opposition groups 
could agree. In some cases, this was very concrete: in Slovakia, when the opposition par-
ties finally came together with key civil society actors at the Democratic Round Table, 
they agreed to satisfy all EU requirements in an attempt to rejoin the first group of coun-
tries joining the EU. 
 
A similar consensus came about in the opposition coalition, the Democratic Con-
vention of Romania (CDR), and created much-needed common ground between the CDR 
and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR).50 In Serbia, the forces oppos-
ing the Milošević regime all agreed on ending Serbia’s exclusion from Europe – but they 
were far from agreeing on cooperation with the ICTY, or understanding the scope of the 
compliance that they would confront on the road to the EU.51 Still, the goal of “rejoining 
Europe” was important because it provided some map for what will happen after re-
gime change, whether or not the parameters of this effort were well understood. 
 
Adapting 
 
Western actors offered information to opposition political elites and other do-
mestic actors that were adapting to a political and economic agenda compatible with 
liberal democracy and comprehensive market reform. Parties of the center-right and 
center-left had been neither strong nor unified in these countries after 1989, nor had they 
necessarily been “moderate” or “liberal.” Over time, many opposition politicians shifted 
substantially their position on ethnic minority rights and on economic reform to oppose 
                                                 
48I participated in two such meetings, one in Vaduz in 1998 and another in Bratislava in 1999. 
49This was particularly important in the run-up to the Slovak elections of 1998: see Fisher 2006; 
and Henderson 2004. 
50On Slovakia, interviews with Grigorij Mesežnikov and Eduard Kukan, Bratislava, 1998. See also 
Bútora, Mesežnikov, and Bútorová 1999. On Romania, interviews with members of parliament 
from the DCR, Bucharest, 1998. 
51Interviews with Miljenko Dereta, Jovan Teokarević and Jelica Minić, Belgrade, 2005. See also the 
issues of the first EU-focused publication in Belgrade, Evropski Forum, 2004 and 2005, with articles 
and editorials by Serbian politicians and academics.   19 
the illiberal regime, and to make their parties fit the increasingly attractive “pro-EU 
space” on the political spectrum.52 This space was particularly attractive given the grow-
ing and increasingly visible costs of illiberal rule. What motivated individual political 
elites was in each case a different mixture of political calculation, on the one hand, and a 
desire to promote the “European” vocation of their countries, on the other. But in most 
cases my interviews, as well as the steady defection of politicians from the illiberal par-
ties, suggested that these individuals considered the political prospects of the opposition 
parties more attractive than the short-term gains of being part of the ruling clique.53 
 
Western representatives of international institutions, governments and non-
governmental organizations were on hand with information for opposition politicians 
and local civil society leaders on the substance of a liberal democratic agenda, placing 
particular emphasis on political accountability, on fostering an open pluralistic political 
arena, and on rights for ethnic minorities within this arena. In many cases, Western ac-
tors served to validate the information presented by local pro-democracy NGOs. Many 
different Western organizations and governments interacted with opposition elites 
through countless meetings, workshops and conferences in national capitals and abroad, 
and also supported opposition groups with financial assistance.54 Local opposition elites 
often moved directly from Western-funded NGOs or academic institutions into politics. 
Thus EU leverage, in concert with the influence of other international actors, strength-
ened pro-EU civic groups and shaped how opposition parties portrayed themselves in 
the election campaign, and which parties they chose to cooperate with before and after 
the elections. 
 
Scholars studying the incidence and success of democratization have turned in 
recent years to the role of nongovernmental organizations and civic groups in mobiliz-
ing the population against undemocratic leaders.55 In many cases international actors 
have been linked to civic mobilization, for example, through funding for nongovern-
mental organizations, election monitoring and advising. Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik 
note the “virtuous circle” between Polish domestic organizations and their Western 
partners, which provided support critical to establishing a strong civil society in Poland 
in the early 1990s. The most support was channeled to the three states that needed it 
least – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – at the price of “deepening vicious 
circles” elsewhere.56 But by the late 1990s, Western funding for and attention to NGOs in 
other postcommunist countries had increased substantially. A “virtuous” circle emerged 
                                                 
52Jon Pevehouse also argues that international organizations may change the positions of elite ac-
tors, but he attributes these changes to persuasion and to guarantees for authoritarian elites, 
while I attribute them here to changing political incentive structures. See Pevehouse 2002: 524. 
53Pavol Demeš, interviews in Bratislava, 1998 and 2005. Interviews with former opposition mem-
bers in Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo in 2004 and 2005. On the evolution of the Slovak and Cro-
atian opposition, see Fisher 2006. 
54The organizations included the British Council, the British Know How Fund, the Charles Mott 
Foundation, the EastWest Institute, the Foundation for a Civil Society, the International Republi-
can Institute, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the National Democratic Institute. For a 
related argument see Solingen 1998. 
55Demeš and Forbrig eds. 2005. 
56Ekiert and Kubik 2000, 48-49. See also Mendelson and Glenn eds. 2002; and Ottaway and Caro-
thers eds. 2000.   20 
most clearly in Slovakia.57 Local NGOs played a special role, compensating for the weak-
ness of opposition parties with extensive surveillance and criticism of the illiberal gov-
ernment, and helping to generate the momentum for cooperation among the opposition 
parties. Since then, the “Slovak model” for turning civil society against illiberal rulers 
has been “exported” by Slovak NGOs to Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine – with Western 
assistance. 
 
Another factor that paved the way for adapting to an EU-compatible agenda by 
local politicians was that the EU enlargement process helped break the information mo-
nopoly of the illiberal regime. Evaluations of a country’s progress within the EU’s pre-
accession process provided a powerful alternative source of information on the political 
and economic performance of the government. While the Commission does not have an 
information strategy as such, it does make an effort to explain fully and publicly its 
assessments of the states at each milestone in the pre-accession process.58 As the enlarge-
ment project continued, EU leaders became more willing to take a decisive stand on is-
sues of domestic politics in the candidate countries, leading to very specific démarches 
against Slovakia’s Mečiar government, and outright financial assistance for and coach-
ing of opposition elites in Serbia in the late 1990s. 
 
The EU’s vocal criticism – echoed by a growing number of local civil society 
groups and opposition parties – gradually helped reveal that illiberal ruling parties were 
not, despite their claims, leading the countries to prosperity and to Europe. This criti-
cism undermined the political strategies of ethnic nationalism and economic corruption 
used by the illiberal regime, and suggested alternative strategies that were usable for op-
position elites. It countered two messages: that ethnic nationalism was about protecting 
the nation, and that slow reform was about protecting the average citizen. The role of 
the EU in changing the information environment echoes Jack Snyder’s argument that 
“the influence of the international community may be essential to help break up infor-
mation monopolies, especially in states with very weak journalistic traditions and a 
weak civil society.”59 
 
4. Staying the Course After Watershed Elections 
 
Illiberal regimes lost elections in Romania in 1996, in Bulgaria in 1997, in Slovakia 
in 1998, in Croatia in 2000, and in Serbia in 2000 (see Table 2).60  They were replaced by 
coalitions of “reformers” intent on implementing reforms and move the country forward 
in the EU’s pre-accession process (see Table 3). I am not arguing that EU leverage was 
decisive in the electoral defeats of these illiberal regimes; rather, it was decisive in shap-
ing the political and economic agendas of the opposition parties that came to power – 
and ensuring that these agendas were carried out.61  This included enmeshing the state 
                                                 
57Interview with Robert Benjamin, National Democratic Institute, Washington, DC, 2003. 
58Interview with Pierre Mirel, European Commission, Brussels, 2003. Interviews with other Com-
mission officials in Brussels, 2005. 
59Snyder 2000, 355. 
60For a different angle on the importance of these elections, see Bunce and Wolchik 2006. 
61For a similar argument emphasizing the power of ideas in combination with conditionality, see 
Marinov 2004.   21 
in progressively satisfying the requirements of the EU’s pre-accession process. Once this 
occurred, the high costs of pulling out of this process motivated even previously illiberal 
ruling parties to adopt a political strategy that is compatible with qualifying for EU 
membership. After the watershed elections, we see virtually no backsliding as successive 
governments make progress on political and economic reform. They may move forward 
quickly (Slovakia) or slowly (Serbia), but there have been no wholesale reversals of 
policy, despite electoral turnover. The case for forward momentum is weakest in Bosnia 
and Serbia, as I explore below. I now turn to two mechanisms that help pull countries 
toward a more liberal trajectory after watershed elections, and help prevent illiberal 
reversals after subsequent elections. 
 
Conditionality 
 
Conditionality has played a key role in ensuring the implementation of political 
and economic reforms by the governments that succeeded the illiberal rulers in power. 
The character of the EU’s pre-accession process requires implementation: in order to 
deliver on promises to improve the country’s standing, opposition politicians had to fol-
low through with extensive reforms once in office. Opposition politicians knew that 
their preelection rhetoric would be judged against their post-election actions in the EU’s 
monitoring reports. The tasks at hand and the payoffs for these politicians have varied 
enormously. In 1998, Slovak party leaders worked to correct the political transgressions 
of the previous regime and catch up with ECE frontrunners in the negotiations in order 
to join the EU in the first wave in 2004. In 2000, Serbian party leaders began cooperation 
with the ICTY and attempted basic economic reforms in order to end Serbia’s isolation 
and acute economic backwardness, and in hopes of signing an association agreement 
with the EU that is still in limbo in 2006. 
 
The EU’s leverage compels all governments to tackle certain politically difficult 
and inconvenient reforms, such as creating an independent civil service, reforming the 
judiciary or accelerating bank privatization, and to stick to them over time. Ultimately 
the pre-accession process is centered on a strategy of gate-keeping: if a candidate does 
not comply, it can be held back from the next stage in the process. For the first eight 
postcommunist candidates, the main stages were: (1) beginning screening; (2) opening 
negotiations after satisfying the Copenhagen Criteria; (3) closing particular chapters in 
the negotiations; and (4) completing the negotiations. A candidate could move up 
thanks to accelerated reform, or slip back as a sanction for unfulfilled promises to imple-
ment reform – though toward the end of the process the decision to admit eight post-
communist states all at once in 2004 was a political one. For Bulgaria and Romania, a 
fifth step has been added consisting of a final evaluation of their administrative capa-
bilities with the possibility of postponing accession by one year.   22 
Table 2: Illiberal Regimes and Watershed Elections, 1990-2000 
 
Country  Illiberal Regime  In Office  Watershed 
Elections 
      
Romania  National Salvation Front then Party of 
Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR) 
1990-96 1996 
  With extremist left & right parties     
  Leader: President Ion Iliescu     
Bulgaria  Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 1989-91  1997 
  BSP-controlled governments of experts  1992-94 
1994-96 
 
  Leader: Multiple     
Slovakia  Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS) 
1992-94 1998 
  With extremist left & right parties     
  Leader: Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar    
Croatia  Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 1990-2000  2000 
  With extremist right parties     
  Leader: President Franjo Tudjman     
Serbia  Socialist Party of Serbia (SDS) & Radical 
Party of Serbia (SRS) 
1990-2000 2000 
  Leader: President Solbodan Milosevic     
Bosnia  Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA) 1990-2000 
2002-06 
2006? 
  Serb Democratic Party (SDS) 1990-2000 
2000-06* 
 
  Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-BiH) 1990-2006   
 * SDS with coalition partners     
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Table 3: Reformers and Reforming Illiberals, 1996-2006 
 
Country Reforming  Government  Illiberals  Reform? 
    
Romania  Democratic Convention of Romania 
(DCR) 
Yes. Renamed Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
  Broad coalition of center and right 
parties 
Member Party of European Socialists 
 Leader:  President  Emile 
Constantinescu 
In power 2000-04 
  In power 1996-2000   
Bulgaria  Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) 
Single party. Center right 
Yes. BSP leading party of coalition 
government with centrist parties 
    
  Leader: Prime Minister Ivan Kostov  Member Party of European Socialists 
  In power 1997-2001  In power 2005 – 
  National Movement Simeon II (NMSS)  
  Single party. Center Right   
  Leader: Prime Minister Simeon-Saxe-
Boburg 
 
  In power 2001-05   
Slovakia  Slovak Democratic & Christian Union 
(SDKU) 
Maybe. HZDS part of governing coalition with 
populist socialist and extreme right parties 
  Leader: Prime Minister Mikuláš 
Dzurinda 
In power 2006 – 
  In power 1998-2002   
  SDKU & SMK & KDH & ANO  
 Center-right  coalition   
  Leader: Prime Minister Mikuláš 
Dzurinda 
 
  In power 2002-06   
Croatia  Social Democratic Party (SPD) & 
Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) 
Yes. HDZ returns to power as a conservative 
party in coalition with centrist parties 
  In coalition with small centrist parties  In power 2004 – 
  In power 2000-03   
Serbia  Democratic Opposition of Serbia 
(DOS) 
No. Socialists (SDS) and Radicals (SRS) are 
unreformed 
  Broad coalition of left  center & right forces 
  Leader: Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic 
They have not been returned to power since 
2000 
  In power 2000-03; Djindjic 
assassinated March 2003 
Together they poll as much as 40% of the 
vote 
  Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)  
  In coalition with small parties 
Supported by SDS 
 
  Leader: Prime Minister Vojislav 
Koštunica 
 
  In power 2003 –   
 Inconsistent  behavior as a “reforming 
government” 
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For the Western Balkan states, several stages have been added at the front end of 
the process: (1) a feasibility study for opening negotiations on an association agreement, 
called the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA); (2) opening negotiations on 
the SAA; and (3) signing the SAA.62 For Slovakia, the challenge was getting the green light 
to begin negotiations with the EU. For Bulgaria and Romania, the greatest hurdle has 
been implementing reforms to mitigate corruption and weak state capacity on the eve of 
accession. For Croatia, cooperation with the ICTY and reform of state institutions con-
nected to the secret services and the military prevented the start of negotiations for 
membership until late 2005; they are now underway. For Bosnia and Serbia, the first 
hurdle – satisfying the requirements for opening negotiations on an SAA – has been 
tough indeed. What is important here is that once illiberal rulers are forced to exit pow-
er, EU conditionality kicks in and promotes progress regardless of how far behind a 
country finds itself on the road to joining the EU. 
 
Credible Commitment to Reform 
 
Economic actors have had every reason after 1989 to question how far postcom-
munist states would go in implementing liberalizing reforms. Indeed, many have stop-
ped at some kind of partial economic reform that privileges insiders and fostered cor-
ruption. How can postcommunist governments signal that they are serious about re-
form?63 For domestic and foreign economic actors, especially investors, progress in the 
EU’s pre-accession process serves as a credible commitment to ongoing and predictable 
economic reforms and also to certain ongoing political reforms, especially pertaining to 
state regulation of the economy. Most simply, as Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor argue, 
“institutions affect action by structuring expectations about what others will do”; for 
economic actors, the pre-accession process has created the expectation that comprehen-
sive economic reforms would proceed apace.64  Elsewhere governments also become 
members of  regional organizations in order to signal their commitment to ongoing re-
form by tying the hands of the country’s current and future governments through the 
rules of the organization.65 
 
Once a candidate is well on the way to joining the EU, the costs of losing ground 
or reversing course become prohibitive – for any government.66 The EU’s good opinion 
becomes a direct factor in the decisions of foreign investors, while credit rating agencies 
such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor adjust credit ratings in reaction to EU assess-
ments and to the release of the EU’s Regular Reports.67 And, as I discuss below, qualify-
ing for EU membership is such a mammoth project of domestic politics that it compels 
mainstream parties to reach a consensus about the underlying thrust of political and 
economic reform. The exigencies of the EU’s pre-accession process thus reassure eco-
                                                 
62This is not without precedent: in the early 1990s, the EU did attach conditions to signing asso-
ciation agreements with the first round of postcommunist applicants, though it did not do much 
to enforce them. 
63Haggard and Webb 1994, 21. See also Pevehouse 2005. 
64Hall and Taylor 1996, 955. 
65Pevehouse 2005. 
66Interviews with government officials in Bratislava and Zagreb, 2001 and 2005 respectively. 
67Interview with Joly Dixon, European Commission, Brussels, 1998.   25 
nomic actors that the commitment to liberal economic reforms will be protected from 
two threats: from economic downturns and from government turnover. Continuing eco-
nomic reform becomes the most likely ongoing strategy for current and future govern-
ments. 
 
Ongoing economic reform in the context of the EU’s pre-accession process thus 
serves as a very important signal for domestic and international economic actors, prom-
ising them a stable business environment and access to the entire EU market.68 Lisa 
Martin argues that the forms of international cooperation that offer states the highest 
benefits require them to make credible commitments to one another. She finds that for 
democracies the concerns of economic actors about the credibility of commitments are 
decreased by the participation of legislatures in international cooperation. In the case of 
EU candidates, progress in the pre-accession process signals a seriousness of commit-
ment not only to the EU itself as it weighs a candidate’s suitability for membership, but 
also to a range of economic actors as they weigh a country’s suitability for investment.69 
Progress in the pre-accession process builds credibility using a similar mechanism as 
legislative participation; namely it makes extrication from and violation of international 
agreements very difficult. 
 
Why No Reversals?  A Second Wave of Adapting 
 
The two mechanisms I have described  here – conditionality and credible com-
mitment – highlight the benefits for candidates of the process of joining the EU – as op-
posed to the benefits they receive, and the changes that they undergo, as full EU mem-
bers.70 Most important, the mechanisms of conditionality and credible commitment help 
explain why future governments in the candidate states, despite their very different po-
litical profiles, do not halt or reverse reform. Indeed, these mechanisms ideally trigger a 
second wave of adapting as formerly illiberal (or even authoritarian) political parties 
transform themselves and adopt positions that are consistent with Western liberal de-
mocracy and economic reform. Besides the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the Socialist 
Party of Serbia (SPS) in Serbia, there are virtually no parties left in any countries in the 
EU queue that might win elections or take part in a governing coalition which oppose 
qualifying for EU membership.  
 
Political parties learn that they can adapt their agenda to the expectations of the 
EU and other international actors – and, in some cases, get back very quickly in the po-
litical game. The most dramatic turnarounds so far have been by the PSD in Romania and 
the  HDZ in Croatia.71 While in opposition, both parties shed their extreme nationalist 
                                                 
68For the related argument that voters who are “winners” from the economic transition support 
EU membership as a guarantee that economic reforms will not be reversed, and therefore cast 
their vote for pro-EU parties, see Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky 2002. 
69Martin 2000. 
70 The study of how EU membership transforms members in myriad ways has been dubbed “Eu-
ropeanization.” See Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001. Some scholars use this term also to de-
scribe how candidates transform themselves in order to qualify for membership, e.g. Grabbe 
2006; and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier eds. 2005. I prefer to keep these two processes analy-
tically separate. 
71On the turnaround of PSD leader Ion Iliescu, see Tismaneanu and Iliescu 2005.   26 
rhetoric and adopted a modernizing program based on economic reform and a more ef-
ficient state.72 Upon winning reelection in 2000 and 2004, respectively, both parties con-
tinued to satisfy EU requirements – and on some measures did a better job than their 
“reformist” predecessors. In 2005 the BSP in Bulgaria was also reelected after years of 
gradually shifting toward the agenda of a mainstream European socialist party. All three 
parties were returned to power while their country was still qualifying for EU member-
ship, and made progress toward membership a priority of their government. Ironically, 
as part of the EU’s process, the PSD, the HDZ and now the BSP governments have had to 
tackle endemic corruption in the economy and in state institutions that their party com-
rades helped create. 
 
Shut out of power from 1998 to 2006 while Slovakia implemented reforms that al-
lowed it to join the EU in 2004, the HDZS has taken a different course. The EU made the 
tradeoff faced by the Slovak voter at the 2002 elections abundantly clear: reelect Mečiar, 
and Slovakia will not be invited to become an EU member at the Copenhagen European 
Council summit in December 2002. The HDZS was increasingly frantic to regain interna-
tional respectability. The party program  declared “its irreversible decision to support 
Slovakia’s integration into the EU with all of its might;” but the party’s transformation 
appeared limited to these kinds of declarations.73 The  HDZS has now entered govern-
ment again in 2006, with quite unsavory coalition partners. Since Slovakia has already 
joined the EU, the constraints on its behavior in government will be much looser, and its 
transformation quite different, from that of the PSD , the HDZ or the BSP. 
 
Bosnia and Serbia:  Testing the Limits of the Theory 
  
Bosnia is a unique and bedeviling case because the country functions as an inter-
national protectorate with three separate party systems – that of the Bosniaks, the Bos-
nian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats. Since the end of the war in 1995, power has been con-
centrated in the hands of the three nationalist parties: the Bosniak Party of Democratic 
Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-
BiH). The motor for reform in Bosnia has been the power of the Office of the High Com-
missioner (OHR), whose “Bonn powers” allow for the removal of duly elected but ob-
structionist politicians, and for passing laws by decree. But the power of the OHR and, 
more generally, the involvement of the international community gives Bosnian politi-
cians an easy alternative to spearheading difficult political and economic reforms – do-
ing nothing. This is compounded by Bosnia’s labyrinthine decision-making structures 
and ethnic distribution of power that make any reform attempts all the more forbidding. 
Meanwhile, power has remained in the hands of the nationalist parties that prosecuted 
the war, using ethnic nationalism to rally voters and enriching themselves by controlling 
a deeply corrupt economy. The recipe and the rewards for illiberal elites concentrating 
power in their own hands has been much the same here as elsewhere. 
 
                                                 
72International party links have also played a role. For example, the PSD and the BSP, acceptance 
by the Socialist International and the Party of Socialists (in the European Parliament) was an im-
portant additional external incentive from programmatic change. See Petrova 2006. 
73Bilčík 2002, 25; and Henderson 2004.   27 
Still, changes are afoot in the international community and in the three party sys-
tems that may turn Bosnia’s upcoming 2006 elections into true watershed elections. As 
Bosnia makes (slow) progress toward joining the EU, the imperative of strengthening 
the Bosnian state – and by extension Bosnian politicians – has come to the fore. As the 
European Commission quipped in response to the former High Commissioner, “the EU 
will not negotiate an SAA with Lord Paddy Ashdown.” Most likely in 2007, the Bonn 
powers will be discontinued and the OHR will be merged with the EU’s mission to Bos-
nia. And while the nationalist parties have governed from 2002 to 2006, they have clear-
ly done some adapting to an EU-compatible agenda as relations with the EU have taken 
center stage in the domestic debate. Even the hard-line SDS in Republika Srpska has not 
wanted to be seen as obstructing the start of the negotiations of Bosnia’s SAA agreement, 
and has ceased calling for unification with Serbia.74 The EU finally agreed to open SAA 
negotiations with Bosnia in late 2005 after a divisive package of police reforms was 
passed (and the EU now warns that these negotiations will not be concluded until this 
package is implemented).75 
 
As regards the three party systems, changes that began in 2000 seem likely to ac-
celerate after the crucial October 2006 elections. In 2000, the international community 
provided a very concrete focal point for cooperation among Bosnia’s “non-nationalist” 
parties: the OHR brokered and assisted the creation of an electoral alliance called the Al-
liance for Change. The two main Bosniak parties in the Alliance were the multiethnic 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Bosniak Party for BiH (SBiH); they governed along 
with eight tiny parties as well as small coalition partners among the Croat and Serb par-
ties. The Alliance did have some reform successes, but was extremely fractious and did 
little to break the hold of the nationalist parties on the economy or to take responsibility 
for government from the OHR. For these and other reasons, I do not consider the 2000 
elections as “watershed elections.” In 2002, the Alliance dissolved and the nationalists 
regained power.76 What many observers hope is that the nationalist parties will be un-
seated in the 2006 elections by a mix of stronger, moderate parties representing the Bos-
niaks and the Bosnian Serbs (the Croats are likely to elect the HDZ again), allowing for a 
more effective assault on the stultifying institutional and criminal obstacles to re-
form. 
 
Things would seem to be much more straightforward in Serbia, a sovereign state, 
where the Milošević regime was evicted in the watershed elections of 2000. Yet the 
mechanisms that I set out in this article are functioning only weakly. After the assassina-
tion of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić in March 2003, Serbia suffered a severe slowdown 
in reform as the opposition coalition DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) fragmented 
and lost momentum. After the 2003 elections, the new Serbian government led by Prime 
Minister Vojislav Koštunica and his Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) took a much more 
nationalist stance, yet at the same time the tangible output of compliance with EU con-
ditions increased as measured by some kinds of economic reforms, and by the number 
of indictees delivered to the ICTY. Moving up in the EU’s pre-accession process was 
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gradually fixed as the goal of reform. In the spring of 2005 the Commission assessed 
Serbia-Montenegro’s progress positively in its feasibility study, and negotiations on an 
SAA were set to start in October 2005. They were suspended, however, in October 2005 
and again in May 2006 because of Serbia’s failure to apprehend indicted war criminal 
Ratko Mladić. 
 
Like Bosnia, Serbia has suffered from having the daily bread of domestic politics 
consumed by the unsettled and contentious nature of the state. The status of Kosovo 
and, less so, the uncertain disposition of the federation with Montenegro, has provided 
endless ammunition for the extreme nationalist parties, and easily distracted the voter 
from socioeconomic concerns. It has also enabled the nationalist opposition parties to re-
main nationalist (particularly Koštunica’s party), and forced the more liberal opposition 
parties to take nationalist stands. Meanwhile, it has given the extreme nationalist/ 
illiberal parties – the Radicals and the Socialists – little reason to change how they get 
votes, especially since they are also profiting from the tremendous grip on the economy 
of criminal gangs and from the Serb public’s opposition to cooperation with the ICTY. 
Thus the adapting of illiberal elites from the Radical and the Socialist parties has been 
more of a trickle than a flood, even though neither party has been returned to power 
since 2000.77 
 
Still, there is some movement: members of the Socialists are informing them-
selves about the EU, and the “reform” wing of the party is happy to adopt EU member-
ship as a forward-looking economic program78 The most telling will be if these parties 
form a government while Serbia is attempting to qualify for EU membership, which is 
quite possible given the popularity of the Radicals and the long road still ahead for Ser-
bia. As for Koštunica’s government, during the summer of 2006 it has vocally renewed 
its commitment to apprehending Mladić in order to open the way for the start of the SAA 
negotiations with the EU. So far it has not, as some predicted, turned away from the 
EU’s pre-accession process. 
 
5. How Important Is the Credible Prospect of EU Membership? 
 
My aim in this article has been to identify the specific causal mechanisms that 
translate international influence into domestic political change, breaking the hold of il-
liberal rulers on power and sustaining reforms in the context of the EU’s pre-accession 
process. But is EU leverage a necessary condition for regime change and for locking in 
liberal democratic and market liberalizing reforms? We can point to recent “democratic 
breakthroughs” through watershed elections in Ukraine and Georgia as cases where il-
liberal leaders have been unseated by civic movements in countries that have no official-
ly recognized prospect of joining the EU. These civic movements converged on a “pro-
Western agenda,” and their ability to unify against the illiberal regime was one of the 
keys to their success; the focal point for cooperation and adapting mechanisms functioned in 
similar ways.79 In the case of Ukraine, following the “Orange Revolution” in the autumn 
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of 2004, the government of Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko pledged comprehen-
sive reforms, and sought the prospect of EU membership as an anchor for Ukraine’s de-
mocratic revolution. However, the EU refused, offering Ukraine instead a close relation-
ship in the context of its European Neighborhood Policy. 
 
It is too early to judge Ukraine’s ability to pursue reform following the Orange 
Revolution. The preliminary evidence for what happens after watershed elections with-
out the discipline of the EU’s pre-accession process, however, is not very promising: the 
Yushchenko government’s plans for reform have become bogged down in Ukraine’s 
fractious parliament and its incompetent and corrupt public administration. Both the 
conditionality and the credible commitment mechanisms might have helped, though the 
time span has been too short to conclude that there is not a durable forward momentum 
to reform without them (consider how slowly Serbia has made progress since 2000). In 
the parliamentary elections in March 2006, Yushchenko’s party lost its majority in parlia-
ment. It will be critical to see whether the political parties opposing Yushchenko have 
adapted, or will adapt, to a Western agenda. And until Ukraine gives up trying to make 
the EU recognize it as a credible future member, it will be difficult to disentangle the 
motivations for government policy: what reforms are an attempt to compel the EU to 
accept Ukraine as a potential candidate; what reforms are aimed to satisfy the EU in the 
framework of the ENP to gain greater access to the EU market; and what reforms are 
driven by other factors unrelated to the EU. 
 
Another alternative explanation for the EU membership incentive is to theorize 
that there are different motivations for elite behavior. Anchored in the logic that material 
rewards create incentives for compliance with EU rules, the mechanisms presented in 
this article are part of a rationalist argument that engages a debate that has emerged in 
the international relations literature between so-called rationalist and constructivist ap-
proaches.80 Both seek to identify the mechanisms that translate international influence 
into change: change in the behavior of domestic elites, and change in broader domestic 
outcomes. Studies in the rationalist camp generally argue that mechanisms based on ma-
terial interests and rewards explain the lion’s share of policy change owing to interna-
tional influence.81 Studies in the constructivist camp argue that other, cognitive mecha-
nisms based on the power of norms, socialization and the desire for approbation from 
Western actors must also be taken into account to understand fully the timing and con-
tent of externally-driven domestic change.82 To give an example, rationalists point to 
strategic learning from international actors on the part of East European elites, while 
constructivists would expect to find social learning that is not based on the expectation 
of political or economic gain. Thus Ukrainian elites over time may have been persuaded 
and socialized by an array of international actors to accept the desirability of liberal 
reforms. Yet even here the prospect of membership may weigh in: the social context of 
relations with Western actors will be quite different for elites in a country that is on its 
way to joining the EU than for elites in one that is not.83 
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Conclusion 
 
I have made the case for the important independent effect of EU leverage on do-
mestic political change in illiberal democracies under quite different domestic condi-
tions. I have presented a model that reveals how four different mechanisms of interna-
tional influence function at different junctures during the process of political change. By 
no means does EU leverage erase or even diminish many domestic differences: but it 
does improve the quality of political competition, while narrowing the parameters of do-
mestic policymaking as states comply with EU rules in order to qualify for membership. 
We see a significant – though certainly far from complete – convergence among candi-
dates as they get closer to accession. Under the right conditions, free and fair elections 
provide opposition parties and civic groups the opening they need to end illiberal rule. 
Working in synergy with such forces, the EU’s leverage has had a hand, over time, in 
creating those conditions and making the political systems of the illiberal states more 
competitive. The unseating of illiberal regimes is obviously not confined to states in the 
EU’s pre-accession process. But the EU, I argue – and time will tell – creates the condi-
tions for “locking in” liberal democratic changes, ideally by compelling even the former 
illiberal ruling parties to adapt to an EU-compatible agenda. 
 
If, ten years from now, the EU has coaxed Serbia and Bosnia down the road to 
where Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and even Croatia stand today, then we will have fur-
ther evidence for the effectiveness of EU leverage in overcoming illiberal rule.84 In 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, liberal democratic institutions have become en-
trenched, and the political arena has remained pluralistic and vibrant. Ethnic national-
ism has faded visibly from political discourse, and the participation of ethnic minority 
parties in governing coalitions is routine. The economy and its regulation by state insti-
tutions has improved. Meanwhile, the international position of these states has or will 
soon improve dramatically as they take their seats as full members of the EU. Ultimately 
it is the subsiding of ethnic tensions that may be the most outstanding result, proving 
wrong all of those that argued that the presence of ethnic minorities would scuttle at-
tempts to build liberal democracy. For its part, Croatia is now moving rapidly forward 
with reform of the economy and the state and with compliance with the ICTY; however, 
the treatment of ethnic minority Serbs, including government connivance in their non-
return, remains deeply troubling. 
 
From a global perspective, getting ruling elites to make policies and wield power 
within the parameters set by the EU’s pre-accession process signifies an outstanding im-
provement: better respect for basic democratic standards, more robust political competi-
tion, better protection of ethnic minority rights, ongoing reform of the economy and, in 
some cases, cooperation with the ICTY. However, we see a great deal of variation in do-
mestic policies and performance once illiberal rulers are unseated. It is clear that the 
EU’s leverage cannot work alone but only in synergy with the efforts of domestic actors. 
What stands out on final analysis is the diversity that stems from the choices of these do-
mestic actors, and from the conditions that they face. Thus any theories that seek to di-
vine whether international or domestic factors caused particular domestic outcomes – 
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instead of tracing how international factors may have influenced domestic actors – are 
bound to come up short. 
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